The Responsibility to Protect: A meaningful doctrine , or international virtue signalling?

Evgenia Chamilou

Introduction

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was conceptualised as a catalyst to steer between the Scylla of sovereignty and the Charybdis of human rights. Following the mass atrocities of the 1990s in Rwanda and the Balkans, the doctrine sought to reframe the understanding of sovereignty from a right to a responsibility. In the following article, I will be introducing ‘R2P’ and recent relevant developments.

Due to the breadth of the area, I will restrict my discussion by looking at the contemporary cases of Libya and Syria to illustrate the doctrine’s differing for and pro interpretations among nations. Through these lenses, I will conclude that, unless the doctrine undergoes rigorous reform, it will be unlikely that there will ever come a time when we can truly say ‘never again’. Recently, UN Member states’ support for continued formal discussion of R2P within the General Assembly has demonstrated that today, more than ever, R2P retains its practical utility, political significance and moral salience.

What is ‘R2P’?

According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘R2P’ or ‘RtoP’ is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations (UN) at the 2005 World Summit. The main rationale behind this commitment was to address four key concerns to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, it ‘refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes.’

R2P stipulates three pillars of responsibility. According to the first pillar, every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The second pillar refers to the responsibility of the wider international community to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility. Lastly, the third pillar declares that if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

These principles originated in a 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. In January 2009, the UN Secretary-General released a report on implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Following this, the first General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect was held in July 2009. At this debate UN Member States overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 2005 commitment and the General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (A/RES/63/308) taking note of the Secretary- General’s report.

The Tempestuous 1990s and Genesis of R2P

Following the Second World War, UN Member states promised ‘to save succeeding

generations from the scourge of war.’ Through Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and reinforcement by the terms of Article 2(7) regarding military interventions, they prohibited the use of force. This is not absolute, given the three generally recognised exceptions provided by Chapter VII - self-defence, state consent and UNSC authorisation. Nonetheless, the Charter does not embrace either humanitarian intervention or R2P, as the principle of non-intervention stands in their way.

The Cold War brought several developments outlining the states’ responsibilities towards their citizens, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These indicate that even before the advent of R2P, no state was legally or morally expected to abuse its citizens. Nevertheless, the 1990s saw a fiasco of attempted intervention in Somalia, inaction and failure of international will in the Rwandan genocide and a debacle of sheltering civilians in Bosnia and Kosovo. The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo is particularly controversial although deemed ‘illegal but legitimate.’ Prohibition on the use of force allows for the ‘humanitarian reasons’ and ‘maintenance of democracy’ arguments. This brings us to question, however, who defines the aforementioned.

The 2019 UNGA Plenary

The UN General Assembly held a plenary meeting on the “Responsibility to Protect and the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” on 27-28 June 2019, as part of the formal agenda of its 73rd session. The debate constituted the second consecutive year that the General Assembly formally considered R2P. While the discussion demonstrated broad conceptual agreement on the principle of R2P, member states used the debate to reflect on the widening gap between words and deeds in implementation of the norm. At a time when more than 70.8 million people are displaced by conflict, war and persecution, member states recommitted to taking effective prevention action and timely responses to atrocity risks.

According to the R2P Monitor - a bimonthly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world – there are populations at risk of such atrocities in the following countries; Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma), Syria, Yemen, Cameroon, Mali and Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Nigeria and Venezuela. This renders international action necessary and reiterates that all parties must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, including ending attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as establishing a timetable for identifying and releasing all detainees and abductees.

Never Again? Intervention in Libya and Syria

It cannot be denied that R2P is an emerging human-centred norm; nevertheless, the international community has failed on several occasions to ‘put people first.’ The modern turning point for the first application of the doctrine was the uprising in Libya at the culmination of the ‘Arab Spring.’ Libya was heralded by many as a triumph for R2P particularly since it was thought to be an indication of a change in the collective attitude of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC decided on a military intervention pursuant to Resolution 1973, and had the initial support of regional organisations such as the Arab League.

Nonetheless, fears regarding the implementation of the doctrine were reflected by the abstentions of Brazil, Russia, India, China and Germany. Throughout the debate, there was no reference as to whether R2P would have a legal or normative basis, nor was there any acknowledgement by Obama or Cameron in their speeches as to whether the use of R2P formed a precedent for future action. Given the poorly justified interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, double-standard concerns were also raised, since the doctrine was implemented in Libya but not in Bahrain, a US ally, thus fermenting further cynicism in the global South.

The Syrian conflict, in which approximately 560,000 individuals have been killed, and over 5 million have fled the country, has been contrasted to the Libyan case, and serves as a testimony of the limits of the doctrine of R2P. The overwhelming impact of the conflict on the civilian population of Syria generated controversies regarding R2P’s responsibilities to prevent atrocities and react to stop them being perpetuated.

While the UNSC wrestled through the adoption of twenty-four resolutions since 2013 in relation to events in Syria, it has generally failed to provide adequate responses. The doctrine has not entirely been implemented in any of these resolutions, despite having been referred to on several occasions. Perhaps, the biggest impediments to an R2P intervention were the partitions within the opposition and rebel movements and their links to terrorist organisations such as Islamic State.

Meanwhile, any intervention would likely result in adverse repercussions in the stability of the Middle East, such as instigating an Iranian engagement through Lebanon and Palestine. High stakes and extra-legal reasons incited Russia and China to jointly veto six draft resolutions, with Russia independently vetoing a further six resolutions. As a result, both Libya and Syria wounded the credibility of R2P and have been characterised as the ultimate instances of ‘cynical realpolitik.’

Is R2P Going to Work?

Whilst not being a legal principle, many have argued that R2P is an emerging norm that has provided positive developments in its first decades of existence. These include new structures, presence as a key agenda element in intergovernmental meetings and references in numerous UN resolutions, as well as recognition as a communitarian approach which balances out the right to self-determination and self-governance with a responsibility to uphold human rights and promote peace. R2P could be classified as a norm if it meets the state practice and opinio juris criteria of customary international law.

Yet, these motivations have been a utopia and the doctrine a very nebulous one.

R2P was thought to have a humane approach; however, civilian populations in the Central African Republic, South-Sudan and Syria are still in peril. Combatants in armed conflicts disregard international humanitarian law and deliberately target civilians. Concurrently, the UN is slow in deploying peacekeeping forces, geopolitics and strategic interests persist, and member states systemically fail to translate recognition of R2P into action.

In contrast to Syria and Libya, South- Sudan appeared to be ideal for the application of R2P. This was because there was no risk of a proxy war and none of the permanent five members of the UNSC were substantially involved. However, the conflict has not received adequate attention, conceivably since South-Sudan is considered a poverty-stricken and geopolitically insignificant African nation. The limited success of R2P lies not only in the fact that it faced substantial contemporary challenges but also because its normative content historically had its root in the requirement of authorisation from the controversial UNSC.

Conclusion

As argued, R2P has not only been confronted in terms of its practicality through the prism of contemporary paradigms such as Libya and Syria, but also blatantly criticised since its genesis. I conclude that humanitarian intervention and R2P can be challenged within the milieu of the international law’s encounters with the colonial bequest. R2P has, thus, become a vehicle that disguises interests by proclaiming the primordiality of human rights as a norm.

Without considerable modification of the UNSC decision-making process and its members who have been using R2P as a mask for imperialism, the emerging norm might become a fading one. The responsibility to protect is

not dead. However, endorsing its continued implementation necessitates fundamental improvement. Unless this reform is brought about, R2P will not do justice but instead will become a hubris for international law.